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unitised exploitation of any such resources."5 build on, and may be interestingly contrasted
How could one fail to understand that negotiators with, previous contributions. Thus, while Kwiatwould be doing a gravedisservice to their countries kowska updates her own subject, Prescott/Tiggs
if they failed to arm themselves with a sophisti- and Antunes revert to topics previously treated by
cated understanding of other arrangements?Oth- others-Derek Bowett and Peter Beazley, respecerwise, they run the risk of paying for advantages tively. Other contributions from earlier volumes
that should be presumptively theirs anyway.
have no correlates here and remain valuable: to
Pure data are not sufficient, or there would be take just volume I, Bernard Oxman's leadoff essay
no need for these volumes; the UN Office of on political, strategic, and historical considerOcean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, to name one ations; Prosper Weil's and Keith Highet's pieces
salient repository, already publishes maritime on geographic and geophysical factors;Louis Sohn
boundary agreements. As Tullio Treves wrote on baselines; and Leonard Legault and Blair Hanwhen reviewing the first two volumes of Interna- key's contribution on method, oppositeness and
tional Maritime Boundaries,6 the work is "much adjacency, and proportionality.
The core of this mega-reference work is its premore" than a comprehensive collection of maritime delimitation treaties: "Its strength lies also in sentation and analysis of treaties, which goes far
its scientific elaboration of this material." And as beyond compilation: individual authors are
Charney's introduction to volume I (p. xxx) put it, responsible for separateregions and, in addition to
irrespective of whether practice contributes to the producing the texts, analyze them in regional
formation of norms, "knowledge of techniques reports. This time, Colson and Smith take responused by states to solve their maritime boundary sibility for North and South America, Carl Dundisputes could contribute to the resolution of the das for Middle America/the Caribbean, Tim
Daniel for Africa, Ted McDorman for the Central
remaining disputes."
The intervening years have certainly confirmed Pacific/East Asia/Southeast Asia, Prescott for the
this supposition. Indeed, there have been many Indian Ocean, Chris Carleton for the Red Sea/
more agreements than judgments or awards, and Persian Gulf, Tullio Scovazzi for the Mediterrathe former constitute a far more impressive body nean/Black Sea, Michael Wood for Northern and
of problems and solutions than may be derived Western Europe, Eric Franckx for the Baltic, and
from the vagaries of case law, where so much Smith and Ashley Roach for the Caspian. It is, of
depends on forensic happenstance-lacunae or course, impossible to analyze new treatieswithout
treasures of evidence, the personal inspirations or
putting them in historical and geographical conlimitations of counsel, proclivities of decision text-and so these authors do
just that, and in a
makers, or, indeed, the rigors of pleading with manner that makes this work an excellent port of
deadlines.
call before steaming off to grapple with the comTrue to past practice, the first part of this volplexities of a new problem.
ume consists of a series of essays addressing overall
JANPAULSSON
trends in practice. After a general contribution by
Bruckhaus
Deringer
Freshfields
Colson, they deal with resources, navigational and
environmental factors in delimitation (Barbara
Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in
Kwiatkowska), islands and rocks (Victor Prescott
InternationalLaw. Edited by Charlotte Ku and
and Gillian Tiggs), the legal regime of agreements
Harold Jacobson. Cambridge: Cambridge
(Don McRae and Ciss Yacouba), tripoint issues
University Press, 2002. Pp. xxv, 440. Index.
(Coalter Lathrop), and "technical input" in mar$90, ?65, cloth; $39.99, ?22.99, paper.
itime delimitation (Nuno Antunes). Some of these
Eritreav. Yemen,SecondStage,MaritimeDelimination, para. 86 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Dec. 17, 1999), 40
ILM 983 (2001), at <http://www.pca-cpa.org>.
6
88 AJIL179, 179 (1994).
5

In their edited collection DemocraticAccountability and the Use of Force in International Law,
Charlotte Ku (executive director of the American
Society of International Law when the book was
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published) and the late Harold Jacobson advance
the broad claim that democracy's spread in the second half of the twentieth century has brought the
use of force to heel. History's inevitable forward
march, marked in particular by the dramatic
developments since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, has been less
than kind to this thesis. Nonetheless, the book successfully delivers on the more earthbound objective of addressing the "failure [in the literature] to
examine issues of democratic accountability when
military forces are used under the auspices of international institutions" (p. 4). The book fills this
scholarly gap admirably. The editors provide a
concise, if conceptually limited, treatment of the
subjects "democracy"and "the use of force." The
book also includes an invaluable mine of data.
Most impressively, DemocraticAccountabilitycontains an unparalleled comparative survey of the
use-of-force regimes operating in nine countries.
These surveys are the book's significant merits.
They overcome the harm done to the project's
broaderthesis by recent, compelling refutations of
the democratic triumphalism that prevailed in the
immediate post-Cold War era. The 9/11 attacks
and subsequent American policy have posed existential challenges to traditional notions of the use
of force and have eroded much of the tentative
hold that democratic legitimacy and international
law might have been gaining on the use of force.1
Democratic Accountability must be credited as
an ambitious and complex project. It operates
along the dual axes of international law and policy,
on the one hand, and comparative domestic law
and policy, on the other hand. Its subject is the
multifaceted issue of "the use of force under international auspices."To complicate matters further,
the book seeks to examine the democratic character of the use of force along both the international
and domestic axes. This additional consideration
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introduces the confounding subject of"democracy"2 to an already difficult project. The book also
collects, as noted above, a series of country reports
written by accomplished commentators that concentrate "on the experience of nine democracies,"
with each having "contributed military forces to
operations conducted under the auspices of international institutions" (p. 5). Thus, Democratic
Accountability merges the disciplines of, inter alia,
democratic theory, political science, comparative
law and policy, and the international law of the use
of force. The book can only survey such an arrayof
subjects and suggest their interconnections. All
the same, as a single-volume resource covering so
much ground, and supported as it is with an accessible presentation of data in the tables in its appendix, Democratic Accountability is bound to form
the starting point of more narrowly focused
research in the future.
In their introduction to Democratic Accountability, Ku and Jacobson make a significant contribution by concisely defining and cataloging the
various manifestations of the use of force under
international auspices, including: monitoring and
observation; traditional peacekeeping; peacekeeping plus state building; force to ensure compliance
with international mandates; and enforcement.
They give credit to a number of other studies for
these classifications, but here they have compressed the studies into an accessible summary, an
effort that is enriched by Edwin Smith's contribution (pp. 81-103) to Democratic Accountability's
introductory materials.
Ku and Jacobson are interested in characterizing the link between democracy and the uses of
force as an international matter. They begin their
study by conceding much on this point. First, the
editors accept that "political theorists regard
democracy as a system of governance within a
state's territorial limits" and that "international
'
Considering the unilateralismwith which the problems [are] fundamentally different . . . and
United Stateshasprosecutedthewarin, andoccupation not susceptible to the same democratic processes
of, Iraq,one cannothelp but look backwith some sadness (and sense of loss) when readingtoday Ku and and institutions of governance" (p. 4, emphasis
Jacobson'sdeclarationthat,wheninvadingAfghanistan
2
in 2001 aftertheSeptember11 terroristattacks,the "US
"Oneof the difficultiesone must faceat the outset
close
attention
to
the
not
is
that
there is no democratictheory--there are only
reactions,
governmentpaid
only of its own citizens,but of a diverseglobalpublic democratic theories." ROBERTA. DAHL, A PREFACE
TO DEMOCRATICTHEORY 1 (1956).
opinion"(p. 3).
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added).This view is supportedby the few commentatorson democratictheorywith whom Ku
andJacobsonbrieflyengagein theirintroduction.
Dahl, Held, and Keohanearereportedlyskeptical
of the democraticpotential of the international
order(pp. 10-11). This concessiondependson a
conventional model of democracythat, by its
nature, is centered on the nation-state.Martin
Nettesheimhas noted a similarcircularityin discussionsaboutthe democraticdeficitin the supranational EuropeanUnion: "This [nation-state]
model [of democracy] serves as the standard
againstwhich the democraticcharacterof the EU
... is measured.On the basisof suchan approach,
it is easyto come to the conclusionthatthe EU has
a 'deficitin democracy'."3
But this view of democracyand the internationalorderis a bit too superficial.Forexample,I
readHeld to be less skepticalof the prospectsfor
a cosmopolitan democracy-and, thus, less
beholdento the conventionalnation-statemodel
of democracy-than KuandJacobsonsuggest.4It
is a disappointmentthat the book's expansive
agendademandsthat,at leastwith respectto conceptualizingthe theoreticallychargedsubjectof
democracy,it relieson a narrowand conventional
definition;in the process,it neglectsmuch interestingworkin the fieldthatdirectlyconfrontsthe
challengesposed by internationalization,cosmopolitanism, and globalization.5Following this
3 MartinNettesheim,Developinga TheoryofDemocJ. INT'LL.
racyfortheEuropeanUnion,23 BERKELEY
358, 359 (2005).
4 It is true,as KuandJacobsonpoint out (p. 11), that
Held views the existing international infrastructure as

inadequateto the task of promoting and sustaining
democracyas an internationalmatter.But he sees the

way out. See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACYAND THE
GLOBAL ORDER 265-86 (1995); DAVID HELD,
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY335-60 (2d ed. 1996);

Ideas,Realitiesand DefDavid Held, Cosmopolitanism:
icits, in GOVERNINGGLOBALIZATION305, 317-20
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002).
5

JiirgenHabermas,in particular,has forgeda new

democratic theory in response to the growing significance of the supranational European Union. His theory
of discursive democracy imagines a European public
sphere that transcends the traditional base ofdemocratic
the nation state. See JORGEN
governance-namely,
HABERMAS,BETWEENFACTSAND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONSTO A DISCOURSETHEORYOF LAWAND
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narrowapproachto democratictheory comes at
the expenseof Ku andJacobson'sobviousinterest
in internationalizingthe subjectof the book.
The secondconcessionto the domestic,rather
than the international,priority of their study
comeswhen Ku andJacobsonnote in theirintroductionthat a literalinternationaluse of forcehas
been precludedby the failureof the UN Charter's
Article43 regime.Instead,theyareforcedto consider what are essentiallydomestic uses of force
pursued "under international auspices." Of
course,eventhis formof militaryengagementhas
been relativelyrare, though increasingdramaticallyin significancesincethe endof the ColdWar.
The book'sneglectof two significantdevelopments of the last decades,in favorof its focuson
internationalusesof force,furtherconfoundsthe
position that the editorsstakeout for the project.
The firstis the shiftthatoccurredduringthe Cold
Wareratowardintrastateconflictsand civilwars.
The secondis the morerecentshifttowardtheprivatizedand often asymmetricaluse of force,especially with respect to internationalterrorism.
These prominent, contemporarymanifestations
Accountof forcedo not fit neatlyinto Democratic
ability'sschemeand areexcluded.
Consideringtheir view that the international
orderis inherentlyundemocratic,andconsidering
that the use of force primarilyhas remaineda
domestic matter, albeit now increasinglysanctionedbyinternationalinstitutions,it is surprising
that Ku and Jacobsonnonethelessmarvelat the
scholarlycommunity's"failureto examineissues
of democraticaccountabilitywhen militaryforces
areused underthe auspicesof internationalinstitutions"(p. 4). With theseconcessions,one might
haveaskedwhat therewas to study.
All of the above requiresthat the editorsturn
their attention to the democratic makeup of
domestic law and policy regardingthe use of
force-for that, given their intellectualperspective, provesto be a truermeasureof democratic
DEMOCRACY(William Rehg trans., 1996); JURGEN
HABERMAS,THE POSTNATIONALCONSTELLATION:
POLITICALESSAYS(Max. Pensky ed., 2001); Jiirgen

Habermas, WhyEuropeNeeds a Constitution,NEW

LEFTREV., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 5, 14, 17. Habermas is
optimistic that such features can be achieved at the
supranational level in Europe.
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influence on the use of force. To this end, the editors have assembled the impressive collection of
country reports.
The editors' conceptualization of democracy is
disappointing for reasons other than that it
detracts from their clear interest in internationalizing their subject. Democracy, Ku and Jacobson
assert, requires only the promotion of the rule of
law and the dependence on majority rule as a principle for decision making. In their introduction
Ku and Jacobson explain that "[a]lthough some
states had some democratic characteristicsfor centuries, the development of democratic governments is a product of the twentieth century. The
trend accelerated sharply with the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989 and the collapse of communism in
the Soviet Union in 1991" (p. 7). Repeating the
statistics that fueled the "end of history" movement at the start of the 1990s,' Ku and Jacobson
note that in "1987, there were fewer than 70 democratic states; by 2000, 120 states had governments that by broad criteria could be called democratic" (id., emphasis added).
The editors' definition of democracy is adequate for the purpose of getting on with their
project: making some kind (any kind?) of democratic diagnosis of the use of force. However, their
embrace of such a limited and formal definition
suggests Susan Marks's critique of "low intensity
democracy."7 The editors' anemic definition of
democracy8 implicates them in the twofold mis-
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take of viewing the revolution in governance that
followed the end of the Cold War as (1) genuinely
democratic and (2) the final and complete ascendance of the democratic model. Marks has effectively challenged both assumptions. First, she
argues that "low intensity democracy," of the kind
invoked by Ku and Jacobson may not be democracy at all. It neglects a "long tradition of democratic thought, carried forward in the second half
of the twentieth century through such concepts as
'participatory democracy', 'strong democracy',
'discursive democracy', 'deliberative democracy',
and 'communicative democracy'." Instead, "low
intensity democracy" primarily serves as a vehicle
for advancing and entrenching global, liberal economic conditions to the advantage of the wealthy
Western nations and global capital. Second,
Marks argues that "low intensity democracy," far
from ushering in the stable governments meant to
preside over the end of history, instead "builds
... highly fragile structure[s]" that are susceptible
to tensions resulting from unresolved political and
economic strains.9
I recognize that DemocraticAccountabilityis not
the forum for exploring in greater depth the complexities of democratic theory and the broader
arrayof models of democracy.10But the editors fail
to acknowledge that there have been challenges to

undemandingstandardis set with regardto more farreaching objectives, such as enhancing respect for
human rights,socialjustice, and civiliancontrolof the
military."Id. at 53 (emphasisadded).
6
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,THE END OF HISTORY
9 Id. at 54-59.

AND THE LASTMAN (1992).

10 See

generally HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY,
supra note 4; AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF
DEMOCRACY(1999); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACYIN THE UNITED STATES:PROMISEAND PERFORMANCE(1996); see, e.g., HABERMAS,BETWEEN
FACTSAND NORMS, supra note 4; HABERMAS,THE
racy altogether." SUSANMARKS,THE RIDDLEOF ALL POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION, supra note 5;
CONSTITUTIONS 53-54 (2000) (citing Barry Gills,
DEIRDREM. CURTIN, POSTNATIONALDEMOCRAJoel Rocamora, & Richard Wilson, Low Intensity CY:THE EUROPEANUNION IN SEARCHOF A POLITDemocracy, in LOW INTENSITYDEMOCRACY:POLIT- ICAL PHILOSOPHY(1997); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DISICALPOWERIN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 3 (Barry CURSIVE DEMOCRACY(1990); JOHN S. DRYZEK,
Gills, Joel Rocamora,& RichardWilson eds., 1993), DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACYAND BEYOND (2004);
and WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, PROMOTING POL- DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY
(Jon Elstered., 1998);
YARCHY:
US INTERVENTION,AND
GLOBALIZATION,
DELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACY:ESSAYSON REASON
HEGEMONY(1996)).
ANDPOLITICS
(JamesBohman& WilliamRehg eds.,
7 "'Lowintensitydemocracy'is one of a numberof
phrasesthat have been coined to highlightthe relative
formality of this conception of democracy. Others
include 'cosmeticdemocracy'and 'fagadedemocracy',
aswell asexpressionswhich eschewreferenceto democ-

8 "Aconceptionof democracytendsto prevail... in
which certain institutions-above all, the holding of
periodicmultipartyelectionsandthe officialseparation
of publicpowers-are takenlargelyto suffice.A signally

1997); L. ALI KAHN,A THEORYOF UNIVERSAL

DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE END OF HISTORY
(2003); WILL KYMLICKA,MULTICULTURALCITIZENSHIP(1996).
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democratic messianism from the start."1 At the trol,' including 'greaterparliamentarycontrol over
very least, the editors' view fails to recognize the the decision to introduce troops into situations of
nuanced and various forms of "democracy" that actual or potential hostilities"' (p. 12).13 Damemerged after the end of the Cold War. Signifi- rosch has been exploring this subject for more than
cantly, time has now proven Marks's second cri- a decade, and her influence on Democratic
tique correct. Many of the "new democracies," Accountability is clear; the narrower question of
especially in the former Soviet satellites, have parliamentary accountability receives concendescended into illiberal or authoritarian gover- trated attention
throughout the nine country
nance. Elsewhere, I have raised questions about
reports.
whether the newly independent states should have
The country reports are Democratic Accountbeen placed in the democratic column in the first
ability's true achievement. Well-written, accessiplace, arguing that majority-rule plebiscites, often ble
surveys prepared by knowledgeable commenleading to the territorialexclusion of racial, ethnic,
the reports are an exceptional comparative
tators,
and religious minorities upon the creation of new
resource.
They place at hand a treatment of each
states, represented only a perilous democratic
law with respect to the use of
state's
constitutional
birth at best.12 Considering the democratic deficiencies plaguing many "new democracies," their force. And in a nod to the editors' internationalizaclassification as such was made possible only by tion thesis, the reports at least consider the "interinvoking "broad,"forgiving criteria in the manner face" between international institutions and
that Ku and Jacobson do in their introduction. It domestic regimes for the use of force, with specific
is hard to see what the editors gain from this strat- attention to the impact that the former have on the
egy. First, they overstate the number of countries latter.
that resolve use-of-force issues, at least presumpThe country reports, for all their utility, provide
tively, in a democratic fashion. Second, by over- inconclusive support for the editors' thesis that
stating the number of "democracies" in this way, there is an increasing parliamentarization of the
the editors accept formal, but superficial, manifes- use of force. Several of the
reporters note such a
tations of democracy as proof of their thesis.
in
their
trend
respective systems, but not without
Among the book's introductory materials, Lori some qualification. Fen Osler Hampson, for
Damrosch's contribution is remarkable for its
example, notes that in Canada, "[a]t the domestic
optimism. She notes a historical trend toward the level, in both
peacekeeping and peace enforceconstitutionalization of the use of force, and
ment operations, the trend is towards more frewithin that trend she emphasizes parliamentary
quent consultation with parliament by the governaccountability via oversight, budgetary control,
ment on Canadian troop deployments" (p. 152).
public debate, and, in some cases, formal approval.
This
parliamentary role is limited to consultaThis notion of parliamentary accountability
however, and is not mandated by the contions,
might be a better characterization of the book's
stitution.
Instead, Hampson's report reveals a
thesis than the one provided by Ku and Jacobin which entrenched support for
culture
son-who, indeed, borrow it for their introduc- political
tion: "In the closing decades of the twentieth cen- international peacekeeping operations, coupled
tury, there was a general trend 'toward with limited parliamentarydecision making in the
subordinating war powers to constitutional con- field of military affairs, raises questions about the
depth of parliamentary accountability for Cana11 ALEXCALLINICOS,
THE REVENGEOF HISTORY: da's use of force. Knut Nustad and Henrick
MARXISMAND THE EASTEUROPEANREVOLUTIONS

on Norway, report that the
(1991); Alex Callinicos, Liberalism,Marxism, and Thune, commenting
22
THEORY
A
to
David
Held,
&
Democracy: Response
SOC'Y283 (1993).
13 Quoting LoriFislerDamrosch,Is Therea General
12 RussellA.
Democracies
TowardParliamenin Interna- Trendin Constitutional
Miller, Self-Determination
41 COLUM.J. taryControlover War-and-Peace
tionalLawand theDemiseofDemocracy?
Decisions,1996 ASIL
PROC.36-40.
TRANSNAT'LL. 601 (2003).
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'armed operation' (bewaffneterEinsatz), meaning
every use of the armed forces that entailed the possibility of their involvement in armed clashes, to be
approved by the Bundestag"(p. 237). This "courageous" (p. 243) democratization of the use of force
must, nonetheless, be qualified on several points.
First, it is a constitutional innovation with a
unique foundation in German history and culture.
For this reason it only cautiously should be characterizedas part of a global trend. Second, many of
the details surrounding the issue of the use of force
complicate the Federal Constitutional Court's
seemingly clear rule. For example, in the face of an

(p. 245) also remains with the chancellor; parliament can neither order the government to use
force nor demand the cessation of the use of force.
Nolte concludes his report on Germany by stating
that it "is too early to draw any firm conclusions in
terms of democratic accountability from the legal
structure" (p. 251) of the German Federal Constitutional Court's 1994 decision.
The Canadian, German, Norwegian, and Russian country reports provide only equivocal evidence of the posited trend toward the parliamentarization of the use of force, and the remaining
country reports seem to disprove the hypothesis
altogether. Ramesch Thakur and Dipankar Banerjee, reporting on India, note that "[w]ithin the
generally supportive policy framework set by the
government, the decision to participate in any specific operation lies more with the bureaucracythan
with the elected representatives of the people.
Debates in parliament are rare and muted"
(p. 189). Surprising for the apparent difference
identified between Germany and Japan on this
issue-despite their similar post-World War II
histories-Akiho Shibata explains that "[a]s long
as Japan's participation is within constitutional
and [pre-ordained] legislative parameters, that
decision is, in principle, within the discretion of
the executive" (p. 219). Reflecting the strong presidential model of France's Fifth Republic, Yves
Boyer, Serge Sur, and Olivier Fleurence explain
that "[i]n reality, . . . the National Assembly and
the Senate have limited control" (p. 294); "the
question of democratic accountability in France is
not principally one of legislative involvement"
(p. 298). The United Kingdom's parliamentary
tradition, although the opposite of the French
presidential model, nonetheless similarly prefers
the executive (in this case the prime minister) in
use-of-force decisions. This preference is a
by-product of the British system's minimization
of the separation of powers, which makes the
prime minister, supported by his or her parliamentary majority, the chief legislative figure in addi-

emergency, the chancellor retains the authority to
deploy forces without parliamentary approval.
That contingency might further confound the rule
if an emergency action is concluded before the
Bundestagis able to vote. The "[r]ight of initiative"

tion to being the executive. Nigel White observes
that in "the United Kingdom, one of the oldest
democracies, [the tension between democratic
accountability and the sovereign's use of force] is
becoming increasingly apparent, though the

Foreign Policy Committee, which comprises government and parliamentary officials, "is illustrative of an important feature in Norwegian foreign
policy-the prominent consultative role played
by the parliament" (p. 163). But this role is not a
sign of the Norwegian government's willingness to
grant the parliament a role greater than that of
consultant regarding the use of force. Military
affairsin Norway, they explain, are a royal prerogative exercised by the government. In any event,
Nustad and Thune have faint praise for the
democratizing effects of the Foreign Policy
Committee. "[T]he most striking feature of
the Committee," they complain, "is its lack of
transparency"(id.). BakhtiyarTuzmukhamedov's
description of the determinative role played by the
upper house of the Russian parliament in the decision to deploy forces internationally also cannot be
regardedas strong evidence of a trend toward parliamentarization. Tuzmukhamedov notes "that
the Federation Council has never refused to give
consent to a request for authorization of a foreign
deployment" (p. 278). Georg Nolte, in his report
on Germany, describes the most frequently
invoked, and probably the most dramatic, example of a potential trend toward parliamentarizing
the use of force. He explains that in 1994, in its
decision in the Military Deployment case, the German Federal Constitutional Court "interpreted
the Grundgesetz [Basic Law] to require every
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weight of constitutional practice still concedes
considerable latitude to the executive in making
such decisions" (p. 300). Finally, Michael Glennon is openly skeptical of the supposed parliamentary trend with respect to the United States. "If
anything," he argues, "the trend in the United
States has been toward less accountability of the
executive to the legislature, not more" (p. 344).
It is also necessary to remark that the country
reports suffer from an unfortunate omission that is
mandated by the project's focus on a few democratic countries. I accept the limits of space and
coherence that bedevil any such comparative
project. But the incredible utility of the nine surveys collected in DemocraticAccountability pleads
for the addition of others. Especially considering
the present geopolitical climate, it would have
been of great interest to know what domestic legal
and political processes operate in the decision to
use force in, inter alia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Poland, South
Africa, and Uruguay. With the exception of Israel,
these countries are top-twenty troop contributors
to UN peacekeeping missions. Brazil, Israel,
Poland, and South Africa are diverse and well-established democracies, presenting distinct systemic and contextual issues of certain comparative
interest.
There is also a compelling argument to be made
that efforts devoted to the study of accountability
regarding the decision to deploy soldiers are better
focused on nondemocratic states. In such countries, including the many African ones that contribute to the use of force under international auspices (including missions of the United Nations
and regional organizations), the risk of illegitimate
uses of force and their accompanying consequences for the human rights of those countries'
citizen-soldiers is exponentially greater than in the
democracies considered in the book; the citizens of
those countries lack the ability to check use-offorce decisions via the democratic process.
Democratic Accountability acquits itself nobly,
most significantly by presenting the comparative
law community with its remarkable country
reports. I take some exception to the way that the
editors conceptualize the constituent elements of
their thesis and particularly would have preferred

[Vol. 100

a more thorough and creative treatment ofdemocracy. Tragically, time has not borne out the book's
broadest claim. Rather than seeing more democratic and parliamentary authority over the use of
force, the few short years since the book's publication have been ones of marked decline. I say "tragically" because I share the conviction that use-offorce decisions increasingly must come to be
legitimated by democratic processes. Certainly, it
is not the editors' fault that history seems to have
set back that agenda. To their credit, with DemocraticAccountabilitywe have the impressive mandate as scholars and policymakers to press forward
with the effort to achieve that goal.
A. MILLER
RUSSELL
Universityofldaho CollegeofLaw
The Constitutionalizationofthe WorldTradeOrganization: Legitimacy, Democracy,and Community in the International Trading System. By
Deborah Z. Cass. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005. Pp. xxvi, 266. Index.
$115, ?60, cloth; $39.95, ?20, paper.
Nonlawyers must surely be surprised to see how
we lawyersget all worked up when the words "constitution" or "constitutionalization" are mentioned. To use, or not to use, the C-word was at the
heart of many legal discussions on the recently
rejected constitution for Europe (or, more correctly, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe). In the context of that other, global
project of economic integration-the World
Trade Organization (WTO)-similar debates are
raging, albeit at an earlier stage of development.1
As Miguel Maduro points out, in the European
context we have moved from talking about a "process of constitutionalization," to questioning
whether such a process represents a European
"constitution" (does Europe havea constitution?),
and then on to discussing whether Europe requires
a formal constitution (does Europe need a constitution?).2 In the WTO, in contrast, we are, for the
' Forthe most recent
sample,seeSymposium:WTO
3 EUR.J. INT'LL. 623 (2006) (with
'Constitutionalism,'
articlesby JeffreyDunoff andJoel Trachtman).
2
Miguel PoiaresMaduro, TheImportanceofBeing
Calleda Constitution:Constitutional
Authorityand the
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